ruirib

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ruirib last won the day on November 4 2013

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About ruirib

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  1. Is there no longer a combined offer for EAM + OA? Without it the renewal price is double when compared to last year... Thank you.
  2. Thank you for that reply, Fabian. I appreciate the candor, which I have seen in past replies, as well. My reason to use EAM and OA is to get a double layer, security wise. I am honest, and if I had to go with a single one, I would go with OA instead of EAM, for the simple reason that OA, in what regards HIPS features, is based on whitelisting and I really don't know of a more effective way to fight unknown malware. As good as behavior detection may be, even recent results show that it's not without failures. By going with the new EIS, even with a better firewall, the best OA feature, malware fighting wise, is effectively lost. I will be contacting support to reverse my decision to convert my EAM + OA licenses in EIS. I do hope you continue to improve OA, as I find the firewall a bit lacking. I guess for the time being I may resort to EAM + OA with no firewall and the native Windows firewall. Thank you again.
  3. In a way, I am trying to get definitive answers to that. It seems that EIS doesn't do that. There is no whitelist of allowed programs, so the HIPS part seems to be gone. The firewall may be better and clearly the interface seems simpler, but it is a lot less informative. If first impressions are confirmed, I think EIS is clearly different from EAM + OA and it provides one less layer in terms of protection. To be honest, I find the offer to upgrade EAM + OA to EIS to be a bit deceptive, as it implies the packages are identical in function. I found the program whitelist was the OA feature I valued the most and that seems to be lost in EIS.
  4. As stated by the title, is it fair to say that? If so, what advantages does EIS (whatever the version number is) bring when compared to an EAM + OA combo? And while you are at it, would you state the disadvantages, from the perspective of the manufacturer? I am running the new EIS version, but seeing the almost complete lack of control over the firewall and the apparent loss of the HIPS features, I am wondering whether i jumped the gun, when I upgraded my licenses. That's obviously my fault, of course, but I would still like to know your opinion on the questions above. Thank you.
  5. You are really seeing the effect of the ill conceived dual nature of the Windows 8 UI. I can bet that when you are trying to add an app, if you move the mouse to the top left corner, you will see OA asking for your input. Should the notification show on the Windows 8 tiled interface? I am not an expert on what Windows 8.x allows in terms of what non Windows 8 metro apps can use for notification, but I haven't seen a such an app showing notifications when you are in the metro UI. That said, the advice given is a good one. You know when you are going to install apps, so if you are really keen on them, setting OA in learning mode is not hard to do. You can also use the mouse as I described whenever you install an app, because you know OA will ask for permission to go on. I am a long time OA user, using it currently in a laptop that started with Windows 8.0 and is now running the latest Windows 8.1.
  6. Fabian, Thank you for your replies. I think there is no point in debating every single point you made, since we would disagree. I think I have stated my concerns and you have provided your views in a clear manner. I think I will agree with you on that initial statement about OA not being known for being an excellent firewall. That seems clear, now. I hope EIS is a better solution, in that respect. Regards
  7. Well, it may be a matter of semantics, but I would call it more of a power user scenario. Any user with a bit more knowledge and a willingness to experiment may install software that communicates over any given port and it should be possible to use OA to protect such ports with minimum effort (or none at all, preferably). Damn, wish you would have told me that about 5 years ago, been wasting license money all this time . Thanks, I appreciate you showing that. As I said before, many people use laptops out in the wild, with no firewall in between. These users surely want to know their laptops are protected, as well. The user who started this on the Windows Secrets Lounge was already advised to add the RDP port to the protected ports list. Indeed, full protection would likely mean "protecting" all ports. If that turns out to be expensive, do it the other way around, unprotect used ports. It would be a more economical way of doing things. It would be easy to produce this from the allowed ports list that already exists for each allowed program. Anyway, this discussion may be a bit theoretical now, since you are doing it anew. That's a commercial decision, not a technical one. I understand introducing limitations in low cost (or free) versions, but somehow diminishing from the feature set of paid versions because of free versions, doesn't look that easy to understand. Of course, different configurations could be used for free and paid versions, even with the added maintainability issues - but that is your concern, and it should not affect your customers. Users expect continued operation with no (or minimal) disruption so that should determine what to do. That doesn't mean that the possibility of giving users the option to choose, let's say,in Advanced Mode, the choice of loading a new set of defaults, with adequate warnings, would not be possible. Even when you introduce a new product to replace OA (Emsisoft Internet Security may it be) and the product works differently in this respect, some existing users that migrate to the new solution (even if not all), will experience similar situations, so warnings and full clarification of the change in behavior will still be required. Look, as I said in my opening post, I understand that this goes back the origin of OA, but this doesn't limit the damage that such a glaring failure from OA can cause. Again, I thank you for your candor. I think you have provided me with enough info to understand the full scope of the situation. Is there any idea on when the new security product will be on the market?
  8. Why do you think only enterprise scenarios would need this? I am a developer, I have MySQL and SQL Server installed both on my desktop and laptop, as I need them for development work. I run my own network at home and I use my laptop in multiple networks. I have my network cards as untrusted in OA and I individually trust machines I want to allow access to my computers. It works fine at home but, in the case of the laptop, I want to use it in whatever networks I intend without need for reconfiguration and I would like it to be stealth and for sure wouldn't want RDP attempts to occur from machines I have not authorized. The purpose of the firewall in OA should include not allowing machines not marked as trusted in networks not marked as trusted to connect to a machine running OA in anyway. I have seen different replies in different contexts. One of such replies is based on the telemetry data collected by Microsoft, that purportedly shows MSE would be effective in a huge percentage of such "real world scenarios" - the telemetry data is collected from "real" computers spread out through the world. If I was to be reassured by such a reply, I would be using MSE, not EAM. Well, I don't see how things can be put that simply. I don't want threats coming in, even if OA is great at stopping them getting out, once they get in. That doesn't make sense to me, I am sorry to say it. I have always seen (and recommended) OA as a great part of a decent security strategy, and I am quite surprised that you are so clearly stating OA's firewall is not that good. I guess I will have to think more carefully whether I can recommend OA, at least for people who will be running it in scenarios where there is no hardware firewall. I also think your previous statement is a bit contradictory. I don't think home users have very complex needs regarding the creation of firewall rules and OA's firewall should be a good option for such users. It does lack in terms of default config, it seems, but even that could be easily overcome, if you so desired. As to the credibility, you should be careful about what you say, really. I came here today alerted by a user on the Windows Secrets Lounge that was simply asking if he should switch from OA to something else. Also, the replies on the Wilders Security forum do not seem to follow your reasoning, at not least not a relevant part. To me, personally, it does affect OA's credibility to the point that I may have to stop recommending it, which is something I have been doing for many years, at least until a decent reply to the questions raised by the test in question is given. I thank you for your openness, even if I am not that happy about OA's firewall apparent weaknesses.
  9. RDP works fine when part of the restricted ports list and the connecting computer is trusted or the network is trusted. The issue is precisely of relevance when you are not behind a hardware firewall, which happens often enough, as it doesn't seem that you want OA to be bought only by those that use it behind a hardware fireall. In such a situation, it would be expected that OA provides complete stealth. Hey, the Windows firewall does it, how is it understandable that OA does not? It would provide a better degree of control. Your reply applies to multiple situations where you are going to use a firewall. If I want to enable MySQL or SQL Server I need to install such apps and open my firewall to allow connections. I don't see how this is different. I understand there is a trade off between ease of use and security and the balance is rather delicate. However, having a firewall that does not provide full stealth by default, is not, IMHO, a very good option. You can even argue that OA is configured to deal with most frequent or most likely threats, but that still is not enough. Microsoft's own arguing about MSE, for example, is that it fares well enough in real life situations, as it protects against most likely threats. Should we use MSE over EAM because of that? I doubt that your answer will be yes, and rightly so. To be honest, this situation is not Emsisoft's fault alone, as much of this situation persists from the time of Tall Emu. I find it rather surprising that you don't see this as a liability, one that can affect OA's credibility.
  10. It would be interesting to have a reply to the concern's about OA's default configuration here and not on Wilders. This is the place where people that use OA should expect a decent reply to the very disturbing results in AV comparative's test. I also find Fabian Wosar's reply to the RDP issue (basically confirming RDP access will always be allowed by default, since the RDP port is not part of the restricted port's list) to be quite surprising. How is it acceptable that in its default configuration, OA behaves worse than the native W7 firewall?
  11. Never mind, I see this was discussed here: http://support.emsisoft.com/topic/14065-online-armor-fares-poorly-in-latest-firewall-test/
  12. The test results are available here: http://www.av-comparatives.org/firewall-reviews/ It is quite surprising that OA had such bad results, when the network is configured as a public network, in Windows. Can anyone from Emsisoft provide a no BS assessment of these results?
  13. Another quick question - with file guard, is it enough to exclude the folder and that will mean all executables in such folder will be excluded as well?
  14. As the title says. To exclude a program from being monitored, is a program rule enough, is it enough to add a fileguard whitelist or should both be added. The manual is incredibly poor, the concepts are much more important than how you do it in the interface (which is pretty obvious).